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Abstract 
In this paper, I consider a range of English expressions and show that their context- 
dependency can be characterized in terms of two properties: 
1. they specify entities in an evolving model of the discourse that the listener is 
constructing; 
2. the particular entity specified depends on another entity in that part of the evolving 
'discourse model' that the listener is currently attending to. 
Such expressions have been called anaphors. I show how tensed clauses share these 
characteristics, usually just attributed to anaphoric noun phrases. This not only allows us to 
capture in a simple way the oft-stated but difficult-to-prove intuition that tense is anaphoric, but 
also contributes to our knowledge of what is needed for understanding narrative text. 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper, I consider a range of English expressions and show that their context- 
dependency can be characterized in terms of two properties: 
1. they specify entities in an evolving model of the discourse that the listener is 
constructing; 
2. the particular entity specified depends on another entity in that part of the evolving 
'discourse model' that the listener is currently attending to. 
Two types of expressions have previously been described in these terms: definite pronouns and 
certain definite noun phrases (NPs). Researchers in computational linguistics and in artificial 
intelligence have called these expressions anaphors (d., [Woods78, Sidn83, GUS77, Hirst81, 
Webb831). 
Linguists however have used this term somewhat differently. Many have restricted its use to 
expressions (usually pronouns) that can be treated analogously to variables in a logical language 
[Chom8O]. A view in linguistics that comes somewhat closer to the Al model can be found in a 
paper by Sag and Hankamer [SH84], who distinguish what they call 'deep' (or 'model- 
interpretive') anaphora from what they call 'surface' anaphora (or 'ellipsis'). Under the former, 
they include personal pronouns, sentential 'it' and null complement anaphora, and under the 
latter, VP ellipsis, sluicing, gapping and stripping. The two types are distinguished by whether 
they make reference to the interpretation of an antecedent - i.e., some object in a model of the 
world constructed by the interpreter of the sentence of discourse ('deep' anaphora) - or whether 
they are interpreted with respect to a previous logical form ('surface' anaphora). While their 'deep' 
anaphors include pronouns, Hankamer & Sag do not consider other expressions like NPs in 
discourse that might also be described in similar 'model-interpretive' terms, nor do they describe 
in any detail how 'model-interpretation' works for the expressions they consider. 
To avoid confusion then, I will use the term discourse anaphors for expressions which have 
these two pr~perties.~My main point will be that tensed clauses share these properties as well, 
and hence should also be considered discourse anaphors. This will capture in a simple way the 
oft-stated, but difficult-to-prove intuition that tense is anaphoric. 
2~omputationally, these properties imply particular things about processing. For example, in interpreting an NP, one 
may always have to consider the possibility - probably in parallel with other possibilities - that it is a discourse anaphor. 
For this alternative, the processor will need to (a) keep track of entities whose speafication the NP may depend on and (b) 
make appropriate inferences with respect to these entities. Other forms of contextdependenaes will have other 
implications for processing. In this paper, I will touch on processing issues for discourse anaphora, but not other 
context-dependent phenomena. 
To begin with, in Section 2, 1 characterize the dependency of an anaphoric expression Xb on a 
discourse entity Ea in terms of an anaphoric function a(Xb,Ea), that itself depends on (1) the 
ontology of the specified entity E, and (2) discourse structure and its focusing effect on which 
Ea entities the listener is attending to. With respect to definite pronouns and NPs, this will 
essentially be a review of previous research. However I will argue that some indefinite NPs 
should also be considered discourse anaphors in just this same way. In Section 3, 1 will move on 
to tensed clauses and the notion of "tense as anaphor", a notion that goes back to at least Leech 
in his monograph, Meaning and the English Verb. I will review previous attempts to make the 
notion precise, attempts that require special purpose machinery to get them to work. Then I will 
show, in contrast, that the notion can more simply be made precise in terms of a set of similar 
anaphoric functions that again depend on ontology and discourse structure. Making clear 
these dependencies contributes to our knowledge of what is needed for understanding narrative 
text. 
2. Background 
2.1. Discourse Models and Specification 
The notion specify that I am using in my definition of "discourse anaphora" is based on the 
notion of a Discourse Model, earlier described in [Webb83]. My basic premise is that in 
processing a narrative text, a listener is developing a model of at least two things: (1) the entities 
under discussion, along with their properties and relationships to one another, and (2) the events 
and situations under discussion, along with their relationships to one another (e.g. consequential 
relations, simple ordering relations, elaboration relations, etc.). The representation as a whole I 
call the listener's Discourse ~ o d e l . ~  
In this section, I will focus on NPs. (In Section 3, 1 will turn attention to tensed clauses.) NPs 
may evoke entities into the listener's Discourse Model corresponding to individuals (Example I), 
31n earlier work, it was only the former that I discussed under the concept of 'Discourse Model'. The notion is not all that 
different from Kamp's 'Discourse Representation Structures" [Kamp84] or Heim's "File Cards" [Heim82]. 
sets (Example 2), abstract individuals (Example 3), classes (Example 4), e t ~ . ~  
Example 1 
a. Wendy gave Eliot a T-shirt for Christmas. 
b. Unfortunately, (it, the T-shiri) had the logo "You ate it, Ralph". 
Example 2 
a. Wendy gave each boy a T-shirt. 
b. (They, The T-shirts) each had a different logo on the front. 
Example 3 
a. The vice president must be over 35 years old. 
b. He or she must also be able to count. 
Example 4 
The dachshund down the block bit me yesterday. 
They're really vicious beasts. 
An NP which evokes a discourse entity also specifies it.5 One way an NP would be considered 
anaphoric by the above definition would be if it specified an entity Ea in the model that had 
already been evoked by some other NP. (In that case, one would say that the two NPs 
co-specified the same entity.) This basic arrangement is illustrated in Examples 1-3 above and is 
shown in Figure la.6 Formally, one could say that there is an anaphoric function a whose value, 
given the anaphoric noun phrase NPb and the discourse entity Ea, is Ea - that is, a(NPb,Ea)=Ea. 
This can also be read as "NPb specifies Ea by virtue of Ean. Definite pronouns are most often 
anaphoric in just this way. 
The other way an NP would be considered a discourse anaphor would be if it used some 
existing discourse entity E, to evoke and specify a new discourse entity Ebl as in 
Example 5 
a. A bus came round the corner. 
b. I signalled to the driver to stop. 
where NPb - "the driver" - makes use of the entity associated with the bus mentioned in 5a to 
4 ~ h i s  does not mean that all NPs evoke entities in the listener's Dixourse Model -for example, I would not want to say 
that a predicate nominal (as in "John is a neuro-surgeon.') evokes a separate entity. On the other hand, I do assume that 
NPs in a quantified contexts evoke discourse entities that are accessible as long as that context holds. For example, 
'Whenever a philosopher debates a computer scientist, the philosopher tums out to have a naive idea of what the 
computer scientist is doin Of course, the corn uler sc~entist always does her best to explain.' (I thank Rich 
Thomason for the exarnple.)teith Stenning has also iscussed examples such as this one. 
5in 
in the 
this use of 'specify', I am following Sidner, who used it to mean, essentially, "refer in a model" as opposed to 
outside world - cf. [Sidn83]. 'refer 
6 ~ o t e  that a discourse entity ma or may not stand for some real-world individual or set. Whether it does or doesn't 
however is irrelevant to these rnoderbased notions of evoke. specify. and co-specify. 
evoke 
specify 
evoke 
specify 
Figure 1. Evoke, Specify and Co-Specify 
specify a new entity - the driver of that bus. 
Here the anaphoric function is of the form a(NPb,Ea)=Eb. In cooperative discourse, there have 
to be constraints on the value of a(NPb,Ea), since only NPb is given explicitly. In short, a 
cooperative speaker must be able to assume that the listener is able to both infer a possible a 
and single out Ea in hislher evolving Discourse M~del.~(This is illustrated in Figure Ib.) I will 
consider each of these two types of constraints in turn. 
Speakers assume listeners will have no problem with a when a(NPb,Ea)=Ea. Inferring a in 
other cases follows in large part from the ontology of the entities specified by NPs - i.e., the 
ontology of our concepts of individuals, sets, mass terms, generics, etc. We view these as having 
parts (e.g., car: the engine, the wheels), having functional relations (e.g., car: the driver), having 
roles (e.g., wedding: the bride), etc. These needn't be necessary parts, relations, roles, etc. Our 
ontology includes possible parts, relations, etc., and these too make it possible for the listener to 
infer an a such that a(NPb,Ea)=Eb (e.g., room: the chandelier; car: the chauffeur; wedding: the 
flower girl). Such inferences are discussed at length in the literature, including [CM81] and 
'AS with any aspect of discourse that relies on the speaker making assumptions about the listener's knowledge, those 
assumptions may in some cases be wrong. Listeners, for their part, try to do their best in making sense anyhow - for 
example, hoping that the further discourse will provide enough information to work things out. 
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Before closing this section, there are hnro more things to say about NPs. First, the above 
definition of discourse anaphor does not apply to all definite NPs: a definite NP can be used to 
refer to something unique in the speaker and listener's shared spatio-temporal context (e.g., the 
telephone - i.e., the one that they both hear ringing) or their shared culture (e.g., the government), 
to the unique representative of a class (e.g., the duck-billed platypus), to an entire class or set 
(e.g., the stars), or to a functionally defined entity (e.g., the largest tomato in Scotland). None of 
these would be considered discourse anaphoric by the above definition. 
Secondly though, the definition implies that one must consider some indefinite NPs to be 
discourse anaphors, since they are essentially parasitic on a corresponding anaphoric definite 
NP, as in the following example: 
Example 6 
a. The driver stopped the bus when a passenger began to sing Aida. 
b. The driver stopped the bus when the passengers began to sing Aida. 
The indefinite NP 'a passenger' in 6a. can be paraphrased as "some one of the passengers", and 
thus is parasitic on the anaphoric definite NP 'the passengers' mentioned explicitly in 6b. This 
does not imply that all indefinite NPs are discourse anaphors. In 'Mary met a boy with green hair' 
or 'Fred built an oak desk', the indefinite NPs do not need to be interpreted with respect to 
another discourse entity and some inferrable relationship with that entity, in order to characterize 
the discourse entity they specify. 
In the next section, I will discuss the second kind of constraint on the function a(NPb,Ea) 
necessary for cooperative use of an anaphor -- constraints on identifiable Eas. These involve 
notions of Discourse Structure and Discourse Focus. Before I close though, I want to point to 
where I'm going vis-a-vis the anaphoric character of tense and tensed clauses. In contrast with 
previous accounts of tense as pronoun or tense as loosely context-dependent, I am going to 
claim that, like an anaphoric definite NP, 
a tensed clause Cb may either specify an existing event or situation Eb in the 
listener's Discourse Model, or it may both evoke and specify a new entity. 
elbe inferability of a in other cases follows from the ontology of entities specified clausally. This I will touch upon in 
Section 3..0ften a speaker can assume that a relates an individual to the generic class it belongs to, as in Exam le 4, or 
the intension of a definite description to its extension - or vice versa - as in 'The President is elected b the 8lectoral 
Colle e In h e  1964 election. he got all but lwo of the votes.. I am not claiming h a t  all inferrable as follow i o m  ontology - 
only 8d ontology sanctifies a great many. 
As with anaphoric NPs, there are constraints on possible anaphoric functions and on 
the E,s that can participate in them at any one time. 
These functions are sensitive to that part of a tensed clause Cb called by 
Reichenbach [Reich] point of reference (here abbreviated RT), as well as its 
relationship to that part called by Reichenbach point of the event (ET). 
These functions can be defined in part in terms of an independently justifiable 
ontology of events proposed (independently) by Moens & Steedman [this volume] 
and Passonneau [this volume]. 
The constraints on Ea are tied in with a temporal analogue of Discourse Focus that I 
have called Temporal Focus (TF), and through TF, with Discourse Structure as well. 
2.2. Discourse Focus and Discourse Structure 
The ideas presented in this section have been formulated and developed by Barbara Grosz 
and Candy Sidner, originally independently and later in joint research. It is not a summary of their 
~ o r k : ~ l t  is limited to those of their ideas that are necessary to the concept of anaphor that I am 
advancing here and the concept of tense as anaphor, in particular. 
Sidner's thesis [Sidn79,Sidn83] presents an account of understanding definite pronouns and 
anaphoric definite NPs that reflects the ease with which people identify the intended specificand 
of definite pronouns (except in highly ambiguous cases), as well as the intended specificand of 
anaphoric definite NPs. 
With respect to noun phrases (but not clauses), Sidner makes the same assumption about 
evoking, specifying and co-specifying in a Discourse Model that I have made here. To understand 
anaphoric expressions, Sidner postulates three mechanisms: 
1. a current discourse focus (DF) 
2. an ordered list of potential foci (PFL) for the next utterance 
3. a stack for saving the current DF and resuming it later. 
The DF corresponds to that entity ,the listener is most attending to. Pronouns can most easily 
specify the current DF, slightly less easily a member of the PFL, and with slightly more difficulty, a 
stacked focus. Specifying an entity pronominally can shift the listener's attention to it, thereby 
promoting it to be the next DF. Anything else specified in the clause ends up on the PFL, ordered 
by its original syntactic position. (Sidner introduced a separate 'agent focus' to allow two entities 
to be specified pronominally in the same clause, but it was not a critical feature of her approach.) 
As for anaphoric definite NPs, they can specify anything previously introduced (whether on the 
gNor does it indicate wholesale acceptance of their theory of discourse as has so far emerged. I believe that they would 
be the first to admit that it's a T.I.P. - "Theory in Progress". 
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PFL, a stacked focus, or anything else) or anything related in a mutually inferrable way with the 
current DF or a member of the PFL. In terms of the constraints I mentioned above, it is only 
those discourse entities that are either the DF or on the PFL that can serve as Ea for an 
anaphoric definite NP.I0 
In [Sidn83] DF always are stacked for possible resumption later. In [GS86] it is an entire focus 
space (FS) [Grosz77] that gets stacked (i.e., the collection of entites L is attending to by virtue of 
the current Discourse Segment (DS)), but only when the purpose of the current DS is taken to 
dominate that of ,the one upcoming. Dominance relations are also specified further according to 
the type of discourse. In [GS86] they are defined for task-related dialogues and arguments. For 
example, in arguments, one DS purpose (DSP) dominates another if the second provides 
evidence for a point made in the first. When the dominated DSP is satisfied, its corresponding FS 
is popped. This stack mechanism models the listener's Attentional State. The relations between 
DSPs constitute the Intentional Structure of the text. Getting a listener to resume a DS via the 
stack mechanism is taken to require less effort on a speaker's part than returning to elaborate an 
argument or sub-task description later on. 
The significance of [Sidn83] and [GS86] for the current enterprise is that: 
[Sidn83] essentially shows how DF can move gradually among the discourse entities 
that make up a focus space, as the listener is processing its associated discourse 
segment; 
[GS86] shows how DF can make a radical jump to a different (possibly newly 
evoked) discourse entity as the listener moves to process the next discourse 
segment.1 I 
I reinterpret this in the current framework in terms of the anaphoric function a(NPb,E,). Within a 
discourse segment, the entity that is the DF is the most likely E,. Over the discourse segment, 
other discourse entities in the segment's focus space may in turn become DF. With a change in 
discourse segment however, the DF can change radically to an entity in the focus space 
associated with the new segment. 
1°Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein [GJW83] have reinterpreted part of Sidner's work in terms of their the0 of centering. Her 
DF becomes their .backward-looking center' Cb and her PFL becomes their ordered list of nforward%oking anterse C,. 
They have proposed heuristics for which entities (Cb andlor Cfs) will be specified pronominally (when specified at all) and 
for the consequences for such specification on subsequent Cb and C,s. 
"This jum is not necessary: the DF can stay the same over discourse segmenk - for example, discussing the same 
entity from digerent points of vlew. 
To hint again at what is to come: in Section 3.2. 1 will propose a temporal analogue of DF, 
which I have called Temporal Focus (TF). In Section 3.3, 1 will show how gradual movements of 
the TF are tied in with the ontology of what a tensed clause specifies - i.e., an ontology of events 
and situations - while more radical movements reflect the effect of discourse structure on TF. 
3. Tense as Anaphor 
Tense may not seem prima facie anaphoric: an isolated sentence like "John went to bed" or "I 
met a man who looked like a basset hound" appears to make sense in a way that a stand-alone 
"He went to bed" or "The man went to bed" does not. On the other hand, if some time or event is 
established by the context (i.e., either by an event or situation described in the previous discourse 
or by a temporal adverbial in the current sentence - cf. [Passonneau, Moens & Steedman, this 
volume]), tense will invariably be interpreted with respect to it, as in: 
Example 7 
a. After he finished his chores, John went to bed. 
b. John partied until 3am. He came home and went to bed. 
In each case, the interpretation of John's going to bed is linked to an explictly mentioned time or 
event. This is what underlies all discussion of the anaphoric quality of tense. 
3.1. Background 
The assumption that tense is anaphoric (i.e., that its interpretation is linked to some time or 
event derived from context) goes back many years, although it is not a universally held belief - cf. 
[Comrie]. Leech seems to express this view in his monograph Meaning and the English Verb 
63 INDEFINITE TIME Whereas the Present Perfect, in its indefinite past sense, does not name a 
specific point of time, a definite POINT OF ORIENTATION in the past is normally required for the 
appropriate use of the Simple Past Tense. The point of orientation may be specified in one of 
three ways: (a) by an adverbial express of time-when; (b) by a preceding use of a Past or Perfect 
Tense; and (c) by implicit definition; i.e., by assumption of a particular time from context. 
73 The Past Perfect Tense has the meaning of past-in-the-past, or more accurately, 'a time 
further in the past, seen from the viewpoint of a definite point of time already in the past'. That is, 
like the Simple Past Tense, the Past Perfect demands an already established past point of 
reference. [Leech, p.471 
Leech did not elaborate further on how reference points are used in the interpretation of simple 
past tense and past perfect tense, or on what has become the main problem in the semantics and 
pragmatics of tense: reconciling the (usual) forward movement of events in narratives with a 
belief in the anaphoric (or context-dependent) character of tense. 
The first explicit reference I have to tense being anaphoric like a definite pronoun is in an 
article by McCawley, who said 
However the tense morpheme does not just express the time relationship between the clause it 
is in and the next higher clause -- it also refers to the time of the clause that it is in, and indeed, 
refers to it in a way that is rather like the way in which personal pronouns refer to what they stand 
for. [McCaw71, p. 1 101 
McCawley also tried to fit his view of tense as pronoun in with the interpretation of tense in 
simple narratives. Here he proposed that the event described in one clause serves as the 
antecedent of the event described in the next, but that it may be related to that event by being 
either at the same time or 'shortly after' it. He did not elaborate on when one relation would be 
assumed and when, the other. 
Partee also noted the similarities between tense and definite pronouns [Part73]. However, she 
subsequently recognized [Part841 that taking simple past tense as directly analogous with 
pronouns was incompatible with the usual forward movement of time in the interpretation in a 
sequence of sentences denoting events. Her response was a modification of the claim that tense 
is anaphoric, saying 
I still believe it is reasonable to characterize tense as anaphoric, or more broadly as context- 
dependent, but I would no longer suggest that this requires them to be viewed as 'referring' to 
times as pronouns 'refer' to entities, or to treat times as arguments of predicates. [Part84, p.2561 
The particular context-dependent process she proposes for interpreting tensed clauses follows 
that of [Hinr86], briefly described below. 
The examples presented above to illustrate the anaphoric quality of tense were all simple past. 
However, as Leech notes (see above), the past perfect also makes demands on having some 
reference point already established in the context. Thus it cannot be in terms of the event 
described in a tensed clause that tense is anaphoric. Instead, several people [Steed82, Hinr86, 
Bauerle]) have argued that it is that part of tense called by Reichenbach the point of reference 
(here abbreviated RT) that is anaphoric. This can be seen by considering the following example: 
Example 8 
John went to the hospital. 
He had twisted his ankle on a patch of ice. 
It is not the point of the event (here abbreviated ET) of John's twisting his ankle that is 
interpreted anaphorically with respect to his going to the hospital. Rather, it is the RT of the 
second clause: its ET is interpreted as prior to that because the clause is in the past perfect (see 
above). 
I will now review briefly Hinrichs' proposal [Hinr86] as to how tensed clauses are interpreted in 
context, in order to contrast it with the current proposal. 
In [Hinr86], Hinrichs makes the simplifying assumption that in a sequence of simple past 
sentences, the temporal order of events described cannot contradict the order of the sentences. 
This allows him to focus on the problem of characterizing those circumstances in which the event 
described by one sentence follows that described by the previous one (Example 9 - Hinrichs' 
Example 15) and when it overlaps it (Example 10 - Hinrichs' Example 21). 
Example 9 
The elderly gentleman wrote out the check, tore it from the book, 
and handed it to Costain. 
Example 10 
Mr. Darby slapped his forehead, then collected himself and opened 
the door again. The brush man was smiling at him hesitantly. 
Hinrichs bases his account on the AMionsart of a tensed clause (i.e., its Vendlerian 
classification as an accomplishment, achievement, activity or state (including progressives). 
Assuming an initial reference point in a discourse, the event described by a tensed clause 
interpreted as an accomplishment or achievement will be included in that reference point and will 
also introduce a new reference point ordered after the old one. Events associated with the other 
Aktionsarten include the current reference point in the event time. This means that given a 
sequence of two clauses interpreted as accomplishments or achievements, their corresponding 
events will follow one another (cf. 9). On the other hand, given a sequence with at least one 
tensed clause interpreted as an activity or state (including progressive), their corresponding 
events will be interpreted as overlapping each other (cf. 10). 
Hinrichs relates his 'reference point' to that of Reichenbach. (Thus, the anaphoric character of 
tense is based on RT and not on the events directly.) However, Hinrichs' notion and 
Reichenbach's differ with respect to the time of the event described in the tensed clause. While 
Reichenbach talks about ET and RT being the same for non-progressive past tense clauses, in 
Hinrichs' account the reference point can fall after the event if a non-progressive past is 
interpreted as an accomplishment or an achievement. This is necessary to achieve the forward 
movement of narrative that Hinrichs assumes is always the case (his simplifying assumption) but 
it is not the same as Reichenbach's RT. It also leads to problems in cases where this simplifying 
assumption is just wrong - where in a sequence of simple past tenses, there is what appears to 
be a "backward" movement of time, as in 
Example 11 
For an encore, John played the Moonlight Sonata. 
The opening movement he took rather tentatively, but then .... 
where the second clause should be understood as describing the beginning of the playing event 
in more detail, not as describing a subsequent event. 
In the account given below, both forward and backward movement of time fall out of the 
anaphoric character of tensed clauses, and the dependency of discourse anaphora on discourse 
3.2. Tense as Discourse Anaphor: In what sense 'specify'? 
With that background, I will now show how tensed clauses share the two properties I set out in 
Section 1 (repeated here) and hence are further examples of discourse anaphora. 
1. anaphors specify entities in an evolving model of the discourse that the listener is 
constructing; 
2. the particular entity specified depends on another entity in that part of the evolving 
Discourse Model that the listener is currently attending to. 
To do this, I need to explain the sense in which tensed clauses specify and the way in which that 
specification can depend on another element in the current context. 
Recall that I presume that a listener's developing discourse model represents both the entities 
being discussed, along with their properties and relations, and the events and situations being 
discussed, along with their relationships with one another. For the rest of this paper, I want to 
ignore the former and just focus on the latter. This I will call eventlsituation structure or WS 
structure. It represents the listener's best effort at interpreting the speaker's ordering of those 
events and situations in time and space. One problem in text understanding then is that of 
establishing where in the evolving EIS structure to integrate the event or situation description in 
the next clause. 
In this framework, a tensed clause Cb provides two pieces of semantic information: (a) a 
12Dowty [Dowt86] gives an account similar to Hinrichs' in its a prioriassumption of the non-backward-movement of time 
in simple narratives and its focus on how different aksionart lead to interpretation of co-temporal versus subsequent 
events. The two accounts differ in how the latter is achieved. Dowty's account avoids some problems that Hinrichs' 
cannot, but still cannot deal with the fact that time sometimes 'moves backwards' even in sequences of simple past tense. 
description of an event or situation, and (b) a particular configuration of ET, RT and point of 
speech (abbreviated ST). (Here I may be departing from Reichenbach in treating ET, RT and ST 
explicitly as elements of linguistic semantics, quite distinct from entities of type 'event' in the 
Discourse Model.) Cb then specifies an entity Eb in the Discourse Model whose temporal 
relationship to other events in the model follows (in part) from C,'s particular configuraton of ET, 
RT and ST. Both the characteristics of Eb (i.e., its ontology) and the configuration of ET, RT and 
ST are critical to my account of tense as discourse anaphor. 
The event ontology I assume follows that of Moens 8 Steedman [this volume] and of 
Passonneau [this volume]. Both propose that people interpret events as having a tripartite 
structure (a "nucleus" in Moens and Steedman's terminology) consisting of a preparatory phase 
(prep), a culmination (cul), and a consequent phase (conseq) - as in Figure 2. This tripartite 
Prep cul conseq 
(////////////// ///////////////3 
Figure 2. Tripartite Ontology of Events. 
structure permits a uniform account to be given of aspectual types in English and of how the 
interpretation of temporal adverbials interacts with the interpretation of tense and aspect. For 
example, the coercion of clauses from one intepretation to another is defined in terms of which 
parts of a nucleus they select and how those parts are described.13 
The ETIRTIST configuration is significant in that, like [Steed82, Dowt86, Hinr86, Part841, I take 
RT as the basis for anaphora. To indicate this, I single it out as an independent argument to 
anaphoric functions, here labelled j3. In particular, the following schema holds of a clause Cb 
linked anaphorically to an event Ea through its RT 
P(C,, Ea, RT,) = Eb 
1 3 ~ h e  ontology of an event/situation also includes its role structure. This latter appears to play a part in possible 
anaphoric relations between an NP and an event entity, but not between a tensed clause and an event entity. 
The relationship between Eb and E, then falls out as  a consequence of (I) the particular 
ET/RT/ST configuration of Cb and (2) the particular function J3 involved. 
One possibility is that P links RTb directly to E, - i.e., 
RTb) = Eb 
In this case, the relationship between Eb and E, then depends on the configuration of RTb and 
ET,. If ET,=RTb, then (minimally) E, is taken to coincide in sorno way with E,. This is shown in 
Figure 3a. I f  ETb<RTb (as in the perfect tenses), Eb is taken to precede E,. This is shown in 
Figure 3d. 
Altcrnativcly, J3 may embody part of tho tripartite ontology of events mentioned oarlicr: Pprop 
links RTb to the prcparalory phase of E, (as shown in Figure 3b.) - i.c., 
Pprop(Cb' En, RTI;) = Eb 
while ~ c o n s o q  links RT, to thc consequent phase of E, (as shown in Figure 3c.) - i.e., 
Pconsoq(Cb, Eat  RTb) = E b  
Figurc 3. Anaphoric Relations for Tcnscd'Clauses whcrc ET=RT 
(There is a third possibility - that RT, links to the culmination of En - but it is not clear to me that 
it could bc distinguished from the simplcr Po function given above, which links RT, to E, itsclf. 
Also, while Pprcp and P,,s,q relations for RTb might theoretically bc possible for a pcrfcct, i t  is not 
clear to me that thcsc cases could bc distinguished from thc simplcr Po. In thc case of perfects 
therefore, the relation between El, and Ea is correspondingly indircct.14 
l4l havo not mnsidcrcd other aspcclunl typos in English (such as progrossivo) vis-a-vis possiblo annphoric relations. 
into rating the curront account with work on aspoct and Aktionsarlcn, cf. [Mocns & Stoodrnan, Passonnoau, Hinrichs, 
~adirnousky - this volurno] is loit to fulum work. 
Figure 3 continued. Anaphoric Relations where ET<RT 
The following example illustrates the case where P=Po and ETb=RTb. 
Example 12 
a. John played the piano. 
b. Mary played the kazoo. 
Sentence 12a. evokes a new event entity E, describable as the event of John playing the piano. 
Since the tense of 12b. is simple past, ETb=RTb. Given P,(C,E, RTb)=Eb, then E, is interpreted 
as co-extensive with E,. (Whether this is further interpreted as two simultaneous events or a 
single event of their playing a duet depends on context and, perhaps, world knowledge as well.) 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. Example 8 (repeated here) illustrates the case of Po where 
Now 
Figure 4. Co-extensive Events. 
ETbcRTb. 
Example 8 
a. John went to the hospital. 
b. He had twisted his ankle on a patch of ice. 
Clause 8a. evokes an entity E, describable as John's going to the hospital. Since 8b is past 
perfect, ETb<RTb. Thus if P,(C,,E,,RTb)=Eb, the event Eb described by 8b. is taken to be prior to 
E,. As Moens & Steedman [this volume] point out, the consequences of an event described with 
a perfect tense are still assumed to hold. Hence the overlap shown in Figure 5. 
E 
I b ,  
E 
I a 
\ 1 
1 
conseq(E b) Now 
Figure 5. Ordered Events 
The next example illustrates 
Example 13 
a. John went into the florist shop. 
b. He picked out three red roses, two white ones and one pale pink. 
Clause 13a. evokes an entity E, describable as John's going into the flower shop. Since Clause 
13b. is simple past, ET,=RT,. Thus given P,,,(Cb,Ea,RTb)=Eb. event Eb is taken as being 
part of the consequent phase of E,. That is, John's picking out the roses is taken as happening 
after his going into the florist shop. This is shown in Figure 6. The next example illustrates the 
E 
r a Eb , 
/ \ / 
I conseq( E 1 b 
a Now 
Figure 6. Consequent Phase Relation. 
case of Pprep. 
Example 14 
a. John bought Mary some flowers. 
b. He picked out three red roses, two white ones and one pale pink. 
Since 14b. is simple past, ETb=RTb. Thus given Pprep(Cb,Ea,RTb)=Eb, event Eb - the event of 
picking out some roses - is taken as being part of the preparatory phase of the event E,, which 
when completed, can be described as having bought some flowers. This is shown in Figure 7. 
To summarize, I have claimed that: (1) the notion of specification makes sense with respect 
to tensed clauses; (2) one can describe the anaphoric relation in terms of the RT of a tensed 
clause Cb, its ET/RT configuration, and an existing event or situation entity E, - that is, 
P(Cb,Ea,RTb)=Eb; and (3) there are (at least) three P functions - one, Po, linking RT, to E, itself, 
1 
Now 
Figure 7. Preparatory Phase Relation. 
the o,ther two Pprep and fi,o,eq embodying parts of a tripartite ontology of events. In the next 
section, I will discuss constraints on the second argument to j3(Cb,E,,RTb) - that is, constraints on 
which entities in the evolving US structure the specification of a tensed clause can depend on. 
3.3. Temporal Focus 
Recall from Section 2.2 that Sidner introduced the notion of a dynamically changing Discourse 
Focus (DF) to capture the intuition that at any point in the discourse, there is one discourse entity 
that is the prime focus of attention and that is the most likely (although not the only possible) 
specificand of a definite pronoun. In parallel, I propose a dynamically changing Temporal Focus 
(TF), to capture a similar intuition that at any point in the discourse, there is one entity in E/S 
structure that is most attended to and hence most likely to stand in an anaphoric relation with the 
RT of the next clause. That is, j3(Cb,TF,RTb)=Eb. If Cb is interpreterd as part of the current 
discourse segment, after its interpretation there are three possibilities: 
I. with p, the TF will stay where it is, independent of whether ET=RT or ET<RT. 
2. with Pc0,, , RTb's link to the consequent phase of the TF locates event Eb there, 
shifting  the?^ forward (to E,). This is the 'natural' forward progression of narrative. 
3. with p ,,,, RTb's link to the preparatory phase of the TF locates Eb there, shifting 
the TF backward to (Ed. This is used to elaborate an event or situation in more 
detail. 
These relationships, which I will call maintenance and local movement of the TF, correspond 
to Sidner's DF moving gradually among the discourse entities in a discourse segment. (They 
cover the same phenomena as the 'micro-moves' that Nakhimovsky describes in his paper [this 
volume].) More radical movements of TF correspond to changes in discourse structure. (These 
cover similar phenomena to the 'macro-moves' described in [Nakhimovsky, this volume].) In 
cases involving movements into and out of an embedded discourse segment, either (1) the TF 
will shift to a different entity in US structure - either an existing entity or one created in recognition 
of an embedded narrative or (2) it will return to the entity previously labelled TF, after completing 
an embedded narrative. Such movements are described in Section 3.3.2. Other movements, 
signalled by temporal adverbials and when clauses, are not discussed in this paper.15 ------- 
3.3.1. Temporal Focus: Maintenance and Local Movement 
The following pair of examples illustrate maintenance and local movement of TF within a 
discourse segment and its link with E/S structure construction. The first I discussed in the 
previous section to illustrate The second is a variation on that example. 
Example 13 
a. John went into the florist shop. 
b. He picked out three red roses, two white ones and one pale pink. 
Example 15 
a. John went into the florist shop. 
b. He had promised Mary some flowers. 
c. He picked out three red roses, two white ones and one pale pink. 
First consider Example 13. The first clause 13a. evokes an event entity Ea describable as 'John's 
going into the florist shop'. Since its tense is simple past, Ea is interpreted as prior to ST. Since it 
begins the discourse, its status is special vis-a-vis both definite NPs and tensed clauses. That is, 
since no previous TF will have been established yet, the listener takes that entity E, to serve as 
T F . ~ ~  This is shown in Figure 8. 
Now 
Figure 8. E/S structure after processing clause 13a. 
If clause 13b. is interpreted as being part of the same discourse segment as 13a, it must be the 
case that P(C13blTF,RT13b). Assume the listener takes j3 to be PmnSe, on the basis of world 
knowledge - that is, ~conse,(C13b,TFIRT13b). Since the tense of 13b. is simple past, its RT and 
151 should also note that Rohrer [Rohrer85] suggests that there may exist a set of possible temporal referents, possibly 
ordered by saliency, among which the tense In a sentence may find its reference time, but doesn't elaborate how. That is 
the only thing I have seen that comes close to the current proposal. 
16This is similar to the listener's response to the defjnite NP "the florist shop", which in the middle of a discourse would 
have to be taken anaphorically. At the beginning of a d~scourse, the listener will just create a new discourse entity. 
ET coincide. Thus 13b. specifies a new entity Eb, located within the consequent phase of the TF 
- that is, Ea - and hence after it. I assume that, following the computation of the anaphoric 
function, TF becomes associated with the event entity located at RTb. In this case, it is Eb, and 
TF thereby moves forward (cf. Figure 9). As noted, this is the gradual forward movement of 
simple narratives that Hinrichs, Partee and Dowty were out to achieve. Here it falls out simply 
from the discourse notion of a TF and from the particular anaphoric function PconSw. 17 
E 
f a 
E 
I b ,  
\ I \ I 
b 
conseq( E ) 
a Now 
Figure 9. US Structure after processing clause 13b. 
Now consider Example 15 (repeated here) whose first clause is the same as Example 13a and 
hence would be processed in the same way. 
Example 15 
a. John went into the florist shop. 
b. He had promised Mary some flowers. 
c. He picked out three red roses, two white ones and one pale pink. 
The tense of the next clause 15b is past perfect. As I noted above, the only anaphoric function on 
and an event entity that makes sense for perfect tenses is Po -- that is, 
5b*TF,RT~5b)=E1 5b
Given that perfect tenses imply ET<RT, the event Eb specified by 15b. will be interpreted as 
being prior to E,. Moreover, since 15b is past perfect, the consequent phase of Eb is assumed to 
still hold with respect to FITlSb. Hence the consequent phase of Eb overlaps E,. Finally since TF 
is associated with the event entity at RT, it remains at Ex US structure at this point resembles 
Figure 10. 
Now clause 15c is the same as 13b, and TF is the same as it was at the point of interpreting 
''In parallel with this, given Pp,, TF will move incrementally back into the preparatory phase of the event that was the 
previous TF. Given Po, RT,, is at the TF and TF does not move. 
I 
Now 
Figure 10. E/S structure after processing clause 15b. 
13b. Thus not surprisingly, 15c produces the same change in US structure and in the TF as 13b, 
resulting in the diagram shown in Figure 11. 
I conseq(E ) I 
a Now 
Figure 11. VS structure after processing clause 15c. 
3.3.2. Temporal Focus: Discourse Structure Movements 
To illustrate the effect of Discourse Structure on TF, consider the following variation on 
Example 15, which has the same structure vis-a-vis sequence of tenses. 
Example 16 
a. John went into the ,florist shop. 
b. He had promised Mary some flowers. 
c. She said she wouldn't forgive him i f  he forgot. 
The first two clauses (a. and b.) are the same as in Example 15 and lead to the same 
configuration of event entities in U S  structure (as shown in Figure 10). But the most plausible 
interpretation of 16c. is where the "saying" event is interpreted anaphorically with respect to the 
"promising" event - that is, where 16b-c. are taken together as (the start of) an embedded 
discourse, describing an event prior to John's going to the florists. 
To handle this, I assume, following [GS86], that when the listener recognizes an embedded 
discourse segment, slhe stores the current TF for possible resumption later.18 However, I also 
assume the listener recognizes the embedding not when slhe first encounters a perfect-tensed 
clause Cb, since it needn't signal an embedded discourse, but later when an immediately 
following simple past tense clause Cc is most sensibly interpreted with respect to the event entity 
Eb that Cb evoked.lg At this point, the listener moves TF from its current position to Ebl caching 
the previous value for possible resumption later. Following this gross movement, P(Cc,TF,RTc) 
will be computed. If j3 is then interpreted as or Pprep, there will be a second movement of 
TF.** 
Coming back to Example 16, if clause 16c is taken as being part of a single discourse segment 
with 16a-b, "she saying something" would have to be interpreted with respect to the current TF 
(Ea) - John's going to the florist. This is implausible under all possible interpretations of p.*l 
However, under the assumption that Eb is part of an embedded narrative, the listener can a 
posteriori shift TF to Eb and consider the anaphoric relation 
P(C,, TF, RT,)=E,c 
with Eb as TF. At this point, the listener can plausibly take P to be P,,,, based on world 
knowledge. Since 16c is simple past, ETc=RTc, the "saying" event Ec is viewed as part of the 
consequent phase (and hence following) the "promising" event Eb. As in the first case, TF moves 
to the event located at RTc - i.e., to Ec. This is shown roughly in Figure 12. Notice that this 
involved two movements of TF - once in response to a perceived embedded segment and a 
second time, in response to interpreting p as Pmnseq. 
lBWhile Sidner and thereafter Grosz & Sidner assume a stack of focus spaces with their associated DFs, each of which 
Is resumable, I do not have evidence that the listener can keep track of more than one other node of E/S structure in 
addition to the TF. Resuming any other node seems to require more effort - such as using a 'when dause'. Hence I 
assume a single Item cache for the previous value of TF. 
lg0ne could say, in parallel with [Sidn83], that this Eb was a Potential Focus (PF). However I do not postulate a 
Potential Focus List as in [Sidn83], because I do not think there is ever more than one PF that one can shift to without 
using a temporal adverbial. 
%is is dearly an 'inertial' strategy: it assumes that the listener will prefer to interpret dauses as being in the same 
discourse segment, unless forced to do otherwise, say b a continuation such as 16c. or a lexical item that si nals a 
possible embedded narrative. This I will discuss later on. & spoken text, the s eaker might give an intonation to l ib .  that 
conveys that it and the foilowinp clauses should be understood as an embed& discourse segment, This would be what 
breaks the inertia and causes the listener to shift the TF. 
211t is rarely the case that one cannot come up with a story linking two events andlor situations. Thus it would be 
impossible to reject a hypothesis on grounds of inconsistency. All one can say is that one of such stories might be more 
plausible than the others b requiring, in some sense not explored here, fewer inferences. Crain and Steedman [CS85] 
make a similar argument a L u t  prepositional phrase (PP) attachment. For example, it is not impossible for a cat to own a 
telescope - e.g., by inheritance from its former owner. Thus "a cat with a telescope" is not an inconsistent description. 
However, it must compete with other plausible interpretahns like "seeing with a telescopecope in "I saw a cat with a 
telescope". Thus I assume that interpretations are computed in parallel, with the most plausible prediction being the one 
that ends up updating both US structure and the TF. 
Cache 
Eb E, Ea 
I 1 I 1 I \ 
w conseq(E 1 
Now 
Figure 12. U S  structure after processing clause 16c. 
Now consider the following extension to 16: 
Example 17 
a. John went into the florist shop. 
b. He had promised Mary some flowers. 
c. She said she wouldn't forgive him if  he forgot. 
d. So he picked out three red roses, two white ones and one pale pink. 
As before, clauses b-c form an embedded narrative, but here the main narrative of John's visit to 
the florist shop, started at 17a, is continued at 17d. To handle this, I again assume that TF 
behaves much like Sidner's DF in response to the listener's recognition of the end of an 
embedded narrative: that is, the cached TF is resumed and processing continues.22 
Under this assumption, Clauses 17a-c. are interpreted as in the previous example (cf. 
Figure 12). Recognizing clause 17d as resuming the embedding segment,23 the previously 
cached TF (Ea - the "going into the florist shop" event) is resumed. Again assume that the 
listener takes the anaphoric function to be /3con,q(Cd,TF,RTd)=E, on the basis of world 
knowledge. Since clause 17d. is simple past (ET-RT), the "picking out roses" event Ed is viewed 
as part of the consequent phase and hence following the "going into the florist shop" event. This 
is shown roughly in Figure 13. 
Now getting the listener to interpret a text as an embedded narrative requires providing himlher 
with another event or situation that TF can move to. One way in English is via a perfect-tensed 
clause, which explicitly evokes another event, temporally earlier than the one currently in focus. 
"Recall my prediction that if an but the most recently cached TF is to be resumed, a cooperative speaker will explicitly 
indicate this with a temporal adveriial or a 'when' clause. 
23'So' IS one cue. In spoken discourse, intonation would be another. 
Cache 
0 Now 
Figure 13. US structure after processing clause 17d. 
Another way is by lexical indications of an embedded narrative, such as verbs of telling and NPs 
which themselves denote events or situations (e.g., ones headed by de-verbal nouns). 
This is illustrated in Example 18. Even though all its clauses are simple past (ET=RT), clauses 
18c-d are most plausibly interpreted as indirect speech describing an event which has occured 
prior to the "telling" event. I assume that in response to recognizing this kind of embedded 
narrative, the listener creates a new node of U S  structure and shifts TF there, caching the 
previous value of TF for possible resumption later. The temporal location of this new node vis-a- 
vis the previous TF will depend on information in the tensed clause and on the listener's world 
knowledge. 
Example 18 
a. I was at Mary's house yesterday. 
b. We talked about her sister Jane. 
c. She spent 5 weeks in ~ l a s k a  with two friends. 
d. Together, they climbed Mt. McKinley. 
e. Mary asked whether I would want to go to Alaska some time. 
Notice that, as with embedded narratives cued by the use of a perfect tense, caching the previous 
TF for resumption later enables the correct interpretation of clause 18e., which is most plausibly 
interpreted as following the "telling about her sister" event. 
An NP denoting an event or situation (such as one headed by a noun like "trip" or by a de- 
verbal noun like "installation") can also signal the upcoming possibility of an embedded narrative 
that will elaborate that event or situation (past, upcoming or hypothetical) in more detail, as in 
Example 19. In this case, the original NP and the subsequent clause(s) will be taken as co- 
specifying the same thing. The question here is how and when TF moves. 
Example 19 
a. I was talking with Mary yesterday. 
b. She told me about her trip to Alaska. 
c. She spent five weeks above the Arctic Circle with two friends. 
d. The three of them climbed Mt. McKinley. 
After interpreting clause 19b, the TF is at the "telling" event. 1 claim that the NP "her trip to 
Alaska", while evoking a discourse entity, does not affect the TF. If clause 19c. is interpreted as 
the start of an embedded narrative (as it is here), TF moves to the event entity E, it evokes 
(caching the previous value Eb). At 'this point, using additional reasoning, the listener may 
recognize an anaphoric relation between clause 19c. and the discourse entity evoked by "her trip 
to Alaska". Support for this, rather than assuming that an event-denoting NP sets up a "potential 
focus", just as I claim a perfect-tensed clause does, comes from the reasoning required to 
understand the following, parallel example, where I would claim TF does not move. 
Example 20 
a. I was talking with Mary yesterday. 
b. She told me about her trip to Alaska. 
c. She had spent five weeks above the Arctic Circle with two friends. 
d. The three of them had climbed Mt. McKinley. 
e. She said that next year they would go for Aconcagua. 
The event described in clause 20c. is the same as that described in clause 19c, and should be 
interpreted anaphorically with respect to the entity "her trip to Alaska" in the same way. I f  this is 
the case however, then the anaphoric link does not follow from the movement of TF. 
3.3.3. Temporal Focus: Miscellany 
Example 20 above illustrates one case of an anaphoric function on an NP and a tensed clause, 
specifically P(Cb,E,,RTb) where the entity E, has been evoked by an NP rather than a clause. 
Another possibility is that ct(NPb,Ea)=Eb where NP, is definite by virtue of an entity evoked by a 
clause rather than an NP - that is, Eb is associated with either the 
preparatory/culmination/consequent structure of E,, as in 
Example 21 
a. Mary climbed Mt. McKinley. 
b. The preparations took her longer than the ascent. 
or its associated role structure, as in 
Example 22 
a. John bought a television. 
b. Although he had intended to buy a 13" b/w set, the salesman 
convinced him to buy a 25" color back-projection job. 
where 'the salesman' fills a particular role in the buying event. 
Next, notice that ambiguities arise when there is more than one way to plausibly segment the 
discourse, as in the following example: 
Example 23 
a. I told Frank about my meeting with Ira. 
b. We talked about ordering a Butterfly. 
Here it is plausible to take clause 23b. as the beginning of an embedded narrative, whereby the 
"talking about" event is interpreted against a new node of EIS structure, situated prior to the 
"telling Frank" event. (In this case, ''we" is Ira and me.) It is also plausible to take 23b. as 
continuing the current narrative, whereby the "talking about" event is interpreted with respect to 
the "telling Frank" event. (In contrast here, "we" is Frank and me.) 
Finally, consider things from the point of view of generation. If some event Eb is part of the 
preparatory phase of some event E,, and a description of E, has just been generated using the 
simple past tense, then Eb could be described using either the simple past, as in Example 24 or 
past perfect, as in Example 25 . 
Example 24 
a. John went to the hospital. 
b. He took a taxi, because his car was in the shop. 
Example 25 
a. John went to the hospital. 
b. He had taken a taxi, because his car was in the shop. 
In the case of Example 24, the listenerheader recognizes that Eb is part of the preparatory phase 
of E, and that Eb therefore precedes E,. In the case of Example 25, the listener would first 
recognize that Eb precedes E, because of the past perfect, but then recognize Eb as part of the 
preparatory phase of E,. 
On the other hand, if Eb simply precedes E,, but a description of E, has been generated first, 
then Eb must be described with a past perfect (Example 26): Simple past would not be sufficient 
(Example 27). 
Example 26 
a. John went to the hospital. 
b. He had broken his ankle, walking on a patch of ice. 
Example 27 
a. John went to the hospital. 
b. 'He broke his ankle, walking on a patch of ice. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have presented a uniform characterization of discourse anaphora in a way that 
includes definite pronouns, definite NPs and tensed clauses. In doing so, I have argued that the 
successful use of discourse anaphors depends on two different things: (1) speakers' and 
listeners' (mutual) beliefs about the ontology of the things and events being discussed, and (2) 
speakers' and listeners' (mutual) focus of attention. The former implicates semantics in the 
explanation of discourse anaphora, the latter, discourse itself. It is important that we as 
researchers recognize these as two separate systems, as the properties of discourse as an 
explanatory device are very different from those of semantics. 
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